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Itineraries of an idea: a constitutional convention for
Cyprus
ANDREAS AUER
This Special Issue represents another step in the already quite long history of the
idea of a constitutional convention for Cyprus.
It all began, so to say, in December 2004, when I was invited to an academic
conference in Athens and asked to present a paper on possible lessons for
Cyprus from the Swiss experience. After showing that the Annan Plan, despite
its wording and pretension, had little if anything in common with Swiss
federalism and democracy, I recalled the constitutional lessons we learnt in the
1970s when a new canton—Jura—was added to the Swiss Confederation and
ended by mentioning the idea of a constitutional convention as a possible
means to draft a new and democratic constitution for Cyprus. The immediate
reaction was harshly negative. Complacent smiles politely told me that I
had totally ignored the Cyprus problem, which I could not, and still cannot,
deny.
During the summer of 2005, an eight-member International Expert Panel1
convened by the (Greek) Committee for a European Solution for Cyprus worked
out a piece entitled ‘A Principled Basis for a Just and Lasting Cyprus Settlement
in the Light of European and International Law’. Slowly, after endless and thorny
discussions in the Panel, the convention idea made headway, gained some
support and was finally presented as ‘the way forward’ to possibly solve the
Cyprus problem. The paper was first presented in September 2005 to the political
leaders and the media in Cyprus and then formally submitted to the European
Parliament in October 2005. Again, especially in Brussels, I had the impression
that this thing called a constitutional convention aroused considerable suspicion
and incomprehension.
Feeling that this suspicion might have stemmed from the fact that the
International Expert Panel did not have representatives of the Turkish Cypriot
and Turkish side, the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (c2d) organized
an academic workshop in Geneva in June 2006 with participants representing all
parties to the Cyprus conflict: Greece and Turkey, England and the USA, the two
main Cypriot communities and Switzerland as a neutral chair.2 The aim was to
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discuss and evaluate the basic proposal of a constitutional convention for
Cyprus. Still, misunderstandings about the convention idea did not completely
disappear.
In January 2008 I tried to restate, to summarize and develop this idea in a
paper entitled ‘On the Way to a Constitutional Convention for Cyprus’ that was
published on the c2d website,3 commented upon by the international academic
community and served as a starting point to a bridge-building international
academic conference held in April 2008 in Aarau (Switzerland).
The conference was supposed to deal with process only, and not with
product, trying to outline the basic legal principles that must guide the
convention process and to imagine the sequence of steps that could lead to a
solution, from its opening to its conclusion, without touching on the contents of a
new constitutional arrangement.4
The conference was a failure in so far as the separation of process and product
was constantly ignored by participants of both camps, each one trying, according
to what seems to be a well-established Cypriot tradition, to put the responsibility
for past failures, present stalemates and future threats on the other. But it was a
success in the sense that, for the first time, scholars from all latitudes were
discussing an idea that put the people of Cyprus in the centre of a process from
which it has always been, and still remains, systematically and radically
excluded. Bringing in the people is indeed the sole objective pursued by the c2d
in its strong but exclusively academic commitment for a democratic settlement of
the Cyprus crisis.
And yet, one has to admit that, in five years, the idea of a constitutional
convention for Cyprus has not found so far any substantial and significant
support, neither among the various EU or UN agencies dealing with the issue,
nor among the political leaders and members of the Greek and the Turkish
communities of Cyprus. It has remained a marginal phenomenon, confined to
academic circles and deliberately ignored by the main actors of the Cyprus game.
Why is this so?
The papers published in the Special Issue do not, as a whole, provide a
comprehensive answer to this question. Yet there are some hints and indeed a
few hits.
‘Why should political elites’, ask Fernando Mendez and Vasiliki Triga, ‘give
up their ability to shape a foundational constitutional arrangement that will
determine the eventual rules of the game to a body that may ultimately escape
their control?’ Here we have the first and perhaps the most decisive hit. The
process of democratic constitution-making through a constitutional convention
cannot ignore the political leaders and parties in both constituencies. Yet it
cannot, without sacrificing its democratic credo, give them any power to decide
on the outcome of this process. ‘Ordinarily,’ they continue, ‘elites would need to
be under an extraordinary compulsion to give up this power.’ So far, there has
been no such compulsion on either side.
Marise Cremona and Nikos Skoutaris argue that, ‘In thinking about the idea
of a constitutional convention there is an inherent tension between [ . . . ] the
3Available at ,http://www.c2d.ch..
4Available at ,http://www.aconstitutionalconventionforcyprus.ch.; Andreas Auer and Vasiliki
Triga, A Constitutional Convention for Cyprus, Wissenschaftlich Verlag, Berlin, 2009.
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understandable desire to avoid preconditions (or even second-guesses) as to the
substance of the outcome of the Convention, and on the other the requirements of
legitimacy, which are of course not only procedural in nature’.
That is an interesting hint as well. The implications of Cyprus’ EU
membership for a possible settlement of the conflict through a convention have to
be thoroughly taken into consideration. The authors consider that ‘the
employment of derogations [to the EU acquis] is a political issue that the
constitutional convention [ . . . ] would need ultimately to determine’.
Mehmet Karli puts his finger on an admittedly weak point of the convention
proposal: the role of the International Expert Panel in defining the rules of the
game through the drafting of the Charter that would be submitted to the first
round of double majority referendums. He states that: ‘The question of how the
members of the International Expert Panel will be selected is not determined in
the proposal. Therefore, it is not wrong to deduce that the proposal grants the
Panel the power to inflict reputational costs, and there is no democratic source for
this power’. That is a hit again, for the attempt to substitute democratic
legitimacy with academic scrutiny and objectivity is risky indeed. It shows that
the legal basis problem is crucial to any settlement of the Cyprus problem, and
terribly difficult. Solutions other than academic prevalence may ultimately
prevail.
According to Philip Terrence Hopmann, ‘the long history of animosity and
distrust between the two parties makes it difficult to reach an agreement to call
a constitutional convention, much less an agreement upon a Constitution that
can be passed by referendums on both sides’. And ‘a risk of convening a
constitutional convention is that, by broadening political participation, it might
introduce into the process the mistrust and animosity between the
two communities that has created their divergent identities in the
past’. That might be a hint. But also a strong incentive to finally put aside
the worn out technique of top-down negotiations in favour of a bottom-
up approach.
Klearchos A. Kyriakides warns ‘ . . . that the ambit of any constitutional
convention should extend beyond purely constitutional matters so as to
encompass all aspects of the Cyprus Question, including those relating to
security and guarantees’. He then goes on by inviting the three guarantor
powers, ‘in order to avoid the stance they adopted back in 1959, [ . . . ] to issue a
public proclamation in which they undertake to accept and act upon any
settlement reached on the island by its citizens’. Such a proclamation would
definitely be a hit in Athens, Ankara and London.
Finally, Vassilis K. Fouskas and Alex O. Tackie convincingly, but rather
aggressively, demonstrate that ‘any new constitutional convention in Cyprus has
to take into account the economic conditions in the island’s northern security
sector, particularly today in view of the global asymmetrical impact of the
financial crisis’. This might be considered as a final hint, as the economic
situation of both communities most certainly has to be taken into account by the
convention process.
Critics of the convention idea can be found among members and
representatives of both Cypriot communities. But they are harshest among
those who tend to support the Turkish Cypriot side. This is surprising. As
Mendez and Triga accurately recall, the very legitimacy of what the most recent
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legal opinion calls the local de facto regime called TRNC5 rests entirely on a
constitutional convention. How can one globally reject an item for the whole that
has been successfully used in a part?
* * *
This is it. As academics oblivious to any political agenda relating to Cyprus, we
have to be aware that we can go no further. In its continuous effort to promote a
democratic issue to the Cyprus problem, the c2d has gone to the very outer limit
of academic commitment. This commitment stems from the conviction that
academics need not confine themselves to ivory towers, that research on
democracy must be applied to actual problems of our time, that other countries’
experiences with democracy and constitutionalism might be of some help to
understand and hopefully overcome one of the most divisive conflicts within
Europe over the last 50 years. That task, however, is all but academic.
L’aqua va al mare the Italians say. Like the water flowing from the mountains
towards the sea, the convention idea will eventually make its way. But then, as
we all know, human constructs and political institutions do not generally follow
the laws of nature. That leaves the responsibility for realizing (or not) the idea of a
constitutional convention with the people of Cyprus.
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